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ABSTRACT
“To the cloud!” trumpets a commercial by Microsoft, whose
aim is to herd customers, and their checkbooks, into the cloud
computing fold. But Microsoft, and other cloud providers like
Amazon and Google, might inadvertently be doing just the
opposite. It is not for lack of security or even early adopter
apprehension that potential customers might turn away. Nor is it a
lack of fantastic, cost-saving applications of cloud technology.
Rather, the problem is buried deep within these tech giants’
clickwrap agreements—the ones that customers rarely read and to
which they invariably click “I Agree.” Hidden in these agreements
are limitation on liability clauses, veritable safe harbors for cloud
providers and submerged icebergs for the unwary cloud customer.
Often, these clauses wholly abrogate a customer’s right to recover
damages for his provider’s wrongful acts. In other words, a
provider could purposefully delete its customers’ data or shut down
its users’ websites, leaving the aggrieved customers with no cause
of action and no right to recover.
While limitation on liability clauses are not new to the contract
law vernacular, their inclusion in cloud computing agreements is
particularly troublesome. The amount of potential liability that
customers may waive through a half-cocked click is as enormous as
it is troubling. While courts have recently held that these clauses
are enforceable in other Internet-related areas, courts should be
wary of blindly applying precedent and enforcing these clauses in
the cloud computing context.

INTRODUCTION
As an April Fools’ Day joke, the British online gaming store
1
GameStation made a clever adjustment to its license agreement. The
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modification notified customers that “[b]y placing an order via this Web site
. . . you agree to grant [u]s a non transferable option to claim, for now and
2
[forever] more, your immortal soul.”
Just below this language,
GameStation included an escape clause for the vigilant—by clicking a
different button, customers could avoid forfeiting their souls and would
3
receive a £5 coupon. Only 12% of customers managed to read closely
4
enough to avoid hellfire and claim their coupons.
While the clauses in cloud providers’ license agreements are not
quite so onerous, they do snatch up rights that most cloud customers would
certainly consider important. One variety of clause in particular may prove
5
to slow the cloud market’s growth: the limitation on liability clause. These
clauses, usually buried deep6 within a cloud provider’s click-wrap
7
agreement, limit the damages an aggrieved customer can recover from a
8
9
cloud provider or dispense with a customer’s ability to recover altogether.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/17/gamestation-grabs-souls-o_n_54154
9.html.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
For an interesting discussion on the implications of limitation on liability clauses
in non-digital contracts, see WARRANTIES AND DISCLAIMERS: LIMITATION OF
LIABILITY IN CONSUMER-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 15–30 (Martin Kurer et al. eds.,
2002).
6
See, e.g., The Rackspace Cloud Terms of Service, RACKSPACE,
http://www.rackspacecloud.com/legal/ (last updated Jan. 24, 2011) (including a
“Limitation on Damages” provision in clause 17 of a 29–clause clickwrap
agreement); Google App Engine Terms of Service, GOOGLE,
http://code.google.com/appengine/terms.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011)
(including a “Limitation of Liability” clause in section 12 of its 17–section
agreement).
7
Clickwrap agreements are contracts formed entirely over the Internet which set
forth the rights between service users and service providers. The term “click-wrap”
is derived from the fact that many of these online agreements require a user to click
a button or link to agree to the contract. Francis M. Buono & Jonathan A.
Friedman, Maximizing the Enforceability of Click-Wrap Agreements, 4 J. TECH. L.
& POL’Y 3, ¶1 (1999).
8
See The Rackspace Cloud Terms of Service, RACKSPACE,
http://www.rackspacecloud.com/legal/ (last updated Jan. 24, 2011) (limiting a
customer’s damages to “greater of (i) the amount of fees you paid for the Services
for the six months prior to the occurrence of the event giving rise to the claim, or
(ii) Five Hundred Dollars” (emphasis omitted)).
9
See Google App Engine Terms of Service, GOOGLE, http://code.google.com
/appengine/terms.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (“Google . . . shall not be liable
to you for any direct, indirect, incidental, special consequential or exemplary
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Recently, courts have begun to enforce limitation on liability
10
clauses in click-wrap agreements, but the use of these clauses presents
troubling new concerns because of the high value and volume of data stored
in the cloud. By assenting to these agreements, cloud customers are clicking
away more of their legal rights than they might think. If these clauses—and
the subsequent inadequacy of remedies available to customers—are brought
into the spotlight through litigation, potential cloud customers may choose
not to use the cloud, and current customers might reconsider their reliance
on cloud services. In short, risk aversion could freeze the market. To avoid
such a scenario, courts must analyze these agreements from a fresh
perspective while resisting the myopic temptation to strictly adhere to
precedent.
Comprehending the depth and breadth of the problem caused by
conflating basic clickwrap agreements with the cloud requires a cursory
understanding of each of the contributing terms. As such, Section I of this
Issue Brief will describe cloud computing and how cloud providers and
customers interact. Next, Section II will discuss clickwrap agreements and
the evolution of their enforceability in the courts. Finally, Section III will
analyze how the components combine to create a real problem—that is, how
clickwrap agreements in cloud computer contracts can abrogate cloud
customers’ legal rights. This Issue Brief will conclude with suggestions
regarding how the public and the judiciary can help combat this problem.

I. THE FIRST COMPONENT OF DISASTER: THE CLOUD
11

Identifying a precise definition of cloud computing is not easy.
Some have even pontificated that giving shape to the exact contours of
cloud computing is as difficult “as attempting to capture a genuine cloud

damages which may be incurred by you, however caused and under any theory of
liability.” (emphasis omitted)).
10
See Nathan J. Davis, Note, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of
Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 579 (2007) (“[C]ourts have unanimously
found that clicking is a valid way to manifest assent since the first clickwrap
agreement was litigated in 1998. . . . [A]bsent fraud or deception, the user's failure
to read, carefully consider, or otherwise recognize the binding effect of clicking ‘I
Agree’ will not preclude the court from finding assent to the terms.”).
11
See, e.g., Matthew A. Verga, Cloudburst: What Does Cloud Computing Mean to
Lawyers?, 5 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 41, 42 (2010) (“As Larry Ellison, CEO of
the computer technology company Oracle, put it: ‘The interesting thing about cloud
computing is that we’ve redefined cloud computing to include everything that we
already do. I can’t think of anything that isn’t cloud computing . . . .’”); Jeremy
Geelan, Twenty One Experts Define Cloud Computing, VIRTUALIZATION J. (Jan. 24,
2009, 6:15 AM), http://virtualization.sys-con.com/node/612375 (presenting 21
industry experts’ widely varying definitions of cloud computing).
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12

with one's hands.” Nonetheless, many public and private agencies have
attempted to do so.13 Regrettably, the federal government’s definition of
cloud computing is anything but clear. According to the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources
(e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be
rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or
service provider interaction. This cloud model promotes availability
and is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models,
14
and four deployment models.

To the technologically uninitiated, this definition leaves much
unanswered. Perhaps the best way to introduce the concept of cloud
computing is through analogy. Think of cloud computing as a utility
15
service, much like an electric utility service. With an electric utility, the
parties involved are the providers—large companies that provide the
service—and the customers—individuals and businesses that use and pay
16
for the service. The same basic model exists in cloud computing. Tech
17
companies like Google, Microsoft, and Amazon are cloud providers.
12

David S. Barnhill, Note, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another
Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 638 (2010).
13
Geelan, supra note 11.
14
Peter Mell & Tim Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing, Version 15,
NIST.GOV, (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/upload/clouddef-v15.pdf (emphasis omitted).
15
Michael Armbrust, Armando Fox, Rean Griffith, Anthony D. Joseph, Randy
Katz, Andy Konwinski, Gunho Lee, David Patterson, Ariel Rabkin, Ion Stoica &
Matei Zaharia, Above the Clouds: A Berkeley View of Cloud Computing, UC
BERKELEY EECS 1 (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/Pubs/
TechRpts/2009/EECS-2009-28.pdf (describing cloud computing as “the long-held
dream of computing as a utility”).
16
Some commentators discuss three parties involved in cloud computing instead of
two. In this dichotomy, the group labeled as “cloud providers” is further
subdivided into “service providers” and “infrastructure providers.” See, e.g., Luis
M. Vaquero, Luis Rodero-Merino, Juan Caceres & Maik Lindner, A Break in the
Clouds: Towards a Cloud Definition, ACM SIGCOMM COMPUTER COMM. REV.,
Jan. 2009, at 50, 51, available at ftp://doc.nit.ac.ir/cee/jazayeri/research%20me
thod/a%20break%20in%20the%20clouds%20towards%20a%20cloud%20definit
ion.pdf (describing three actors in cloud computing as service users, service
providers, and infrastructure providers). This further subdivision will be omitted in
this Note because it is unnecessary to the understanding of the issues at hand and
would likely lead to confusion.
17
Brandon Watson, Amazon, Google, Microsoft - Big Three Cloud Providers
Examined, CLOUD COMPUTING J. (Apr. 21, 2009, 10:00 PM),
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Individual users and businesses that utilize the providers’ services are cloud
customers.
Continuing the analogy, just as electric providers supply electricity
to their customers, cloud computing providers supply computing resources
18
to their customers. The scope and type of computing resources may vary
from provider to provider, but most offer three main resources—CPU time,
19
data storage, and bandwidth. Customers use a provider’s CPU time utility
20
when they use the provider’s servers and processors to complete tasks like
sorting data or compressing video files. Customers use the data storage
utility when they use the provider’s hard drives and memory to store their
21
data. Finally, customers use a provider’s bandwidth utility when they
transfer their data from an outside location to the provider’s network or
22
from the network to an outside location.
Cloud customers combine these three primary resources in ways
that correspond to their business goals. For instance, many customers use
23
cloud services to host their websites. Others may use the cloud to store
24
and manipulate scientific data. Amazon suggests that its services match
well with the needs of “Pharma companies, Biotech companies, research

http://cloudcomputing.sys-con.com/node/746859 (describing the ways in which
Amazon, Google, and Microsoft differ in their service offerings).
18
See Vaquero et al., supra note 16, at 51 (“Clouds are a large pool of easily usable
and accessible virtualized resources (such as hardware, development platforms
and/or services.”)).
19
See Armbrust et al., supra note 15, at 5 (describing Amazon cloud service’s main
service offerings).
20
See Conference Proceedings, Ang Li, Xiaowei Yang, Srikanth Kandula & Ming
Zhang, CloudCmp: Shopping for a Cloud Made Easy, 2nd USENIX Workshop on
Hot Topics in Cloud Computing (June 22–25, 2010) at § 2.1, available at
http://www.usenix.org/events/hotcloud10/tech/full_papers/Li.pdf (“A compute
cluster . . . host[s] and run[s] a customer’s application code.”).
21
See id. § 2.2 (“Cloud providers . . . offer persistent storage services that store the
dynamic application data . . . .”).
22
See id. §§ 2.3−2.4 (“Charges for using the wide-area delivery network are based
on the amount of data delivered through the cloud boundaries to the end users.”).
23
Jennifer Marsman, When Does Cloud Computing Make Sense?, MSDN BLOGS
(June 12, 2010, 2:05 PM), http://blogs.msdn.com/b/jennifer/archive/2010
/06/12/when-does-cloud-computing-make-sense.aspx (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
24
See 1000 Genomes Project, AMAZON, http://aws.amazon.com/datasets/438
3?_encoding=UTF8&jiveRedirect=1 (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (describing a
customer’s project that uses the cloud to derive and store the human genome).
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centers and academic laboratories”—customers that will store valuable
25
scientific data in the cloud.

II. THE SECOND COMPONENT OF DISASTER: CLICKWRAP
AGREEMENTS AND LIMITATION ON LIABILITY CLAUSES
Frequently utilized in online transactions, clickwrap agreements
define the scope of the contractual relationship between the customer and
service provider.26 These agreements usually contain a variety of clauses,
27
some of which restrict the actions and rights of the service provider while
28
others place limits on the customer.
Limitation on liability clauses fall squarely within the latter
category and vary widely in severity. Some wholly abrogate a customer’s
right to recover any damages from the service provider, regardless of the
29
cause of the damage, while others limit a customer’s maximum possible
30
recovery in litigation. In either case, clauses that disclaim liabilities are
31
among the most controversial clickwrap agreement provisions.
In the early days of the Internet, courts usually refused to enforce
contracts that were designed to abrogate liability.32 Viewing these
agreements through the lens of contract law, judges either held them to be
unenforceable contracts of adhesion or found particular terms to be

25

Life Sciences, AMAZON, http://aws.amazon.com/lifesciences/ (last visited Sept.
25, 2011).
26
Garry L. Founds, Note, Shrinkwrap and Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not 2B?,
52 FED. COMM. L.J. 99, 101 (1999).
27
Amazon
Web
Services
Customer
Agreement,
AMAZON,
http://aws.amazon.com/agreement/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (denying Amazon’s
right to any intellectual property placed on its servers by its customers).
28
Id. (claiming that Amazon can suspend a customer’s account upon nonpayment
or breach of the contract).
29
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
30
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
31
Davis, supra note 10, at 578.
32
See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 99 (3d Cir.
1991) (finding that a clickwrap agreement was unenforceable due to lack of
affirmative assent); Foresight Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010
(D. Kan. 1989) (noting that “there is some reason to question the enforceability of
any such agreement”).
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33

unconscionable. Recent court decisions, however, signal a jurisprudential
34
shift towards a willingness to enforce these contracts.
35

In Trieber & Straub, Inc. v. United Parcel Service, Inc., for
example, the court enforced a limitation on liability clause in UPS’s
clickwrap agreement.36 The clause at issue stated that UPS’s liability would
be limited to $100 if it lost a package of “unusual value.”37 The plaintiff in
the case had agreed to the terms of UPS’s lengthy online agreement before
shipping a piece of jewelry worth over $100,000.38 When UPS lost that
package, the court held that UPS had validly limited its liability through its
clickwrap agreement.39 The clear terms of the agreement had limited the
plaintiff’s recovery to $100—only 0.1% of the loss suffered by the
40
plaintiff.
This shift toward the enforcement of limitation on liability clauses
is particularly disturbing in the context of cloud computing agreements.
Indeed, the $100,000 loss in the UPS case is a paltry sum when compared to
the potential liability cloud providers could face for their transgressions in
the cloud.

33

Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 762-63 (E.D. La. 1987)
(finding that a shrinkwrap agreement was an unenforceable contract of adhesion
under basic contract law); Founds, supra note 26, at 101.
34
See, e.g., XPEL Techs. Corp. v. Md. Performance Works Ltd., No. SA-05-CA0593-XR, 2006 WL 1851703 at *7–8 (W.D. Tex. May 19, 2006) (holding a choice
of forum provision in a clickwrap agreement enforceable based upon evidence of
assent through clicking); i.Lan Sys., Inc. v. NetScout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F.
Supp. 2d 328, 336–39 (D. Mass. 2002) (stating that a limitation on liability clause
in a clickwrap agreement should be enforceable); Hotmail Corp. v. Van$ Money
Pie, Inc., No. C-98 JW PVT ENE, C 98-20064 JW, 1998 WL 388389 at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Apr. 16, 1998) (upholding the validity of a clickwrap license as a whole).
35
Treiber & Straub, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. 04-C-0069, 2005 WL
2108081 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 31, 2005).
36
Id. at *7–8.
37
Id. at *4.
38
Id. at *3–4.
39
Id. at *12.
40
Id. at *7–8 (holding that the liability of liability clause was “reasonable and the
plaintiff is, therefore, bound by the limitation of liability”).
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III. THE CONTOURS OF THE PROBLEM: COMBINING LIMITATION ON
LIABILITY CLAUSES WITH CLOUD COMPUTING SERVICES
A. The Danger: Cloud Providers Make Potentially Huge Mistakes
Cloud providers go to great lengths to provide reliable services to
41
their customers. For instance, most providers use redundancy to stave off
service outages and ensure that customer data is safe from loss. Yet despite
these precautions, server crashes, hard drive failures, and other disasters do
occur, and customers suffer the consequences. In October of 2009,
Microsoft proved just this point when its cloud experienced a catastrophic
failure. Mobile phone users stored their contacts, calendars, and other data
42
on Microsoft’s cloud. After suffering a series of failures in their cloud
facility, Microsoft sent the following chilling message to its cloud
customers: “Regrettably, based on [Microsoft’s] latest recovery assessment
of their systems, we must now inform you that personal information stored
[in our cloud] almost certainly has been lost as a result of a server failure at
43
[Microsoft].”
More recently, Gmail, Google’s cloud-based email service, has
proven that the dangers of data loss in the cloud still exist, even for
44
customers of one of the most sophisticated cloud providers in the world.
Due to a set of botched software updates, over 160,000 users’ email
accounts were deleted in February 2011.45 Although Google was eventually
able to restore the data, their customer’s accounts were unavailable for
days.46 Alarmingly, 85% of workers under the age of twenty-five use
41

Redundancy, an age-old computer science virtue, refers to maintaining a
secondary peripheral or computer device that can take over if the primary
component fails. REDUNDANCY TECHNIQUES FOR COMPUTING SYSTEMS (William
C. Mann & Richard H. Wilcox, eds., 1962); see also Is Your DAM Thinking in the
Cloud?, HONEYCOMB ARCHIVE, http://www.honeycombarchive.com/cloud-digitalasset-management.cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (“Most Cloud services maintain
data in up to three separate locations. This is an excellent redundancy, should there
be an internet outage or data center disaster. The data is readily available from the
other Cloud locations without an interruption in service.”).
42
Daniel Eran Dilger, Microsoft’s Danger Sidekick Data Loss Casts Dark on Cloud
Computing, APPLEINSIDER (Oct. 11, 2009, 4:55 PM), http://www.appleinsider.com/
articles/09/10/11/microsofts_danger_sidekick_data_loss_casts_dark_on_cloud_c
omputing.html.
43
Id. (emphasis omitted).
44
Gmail Failure Hits 160,000 Users – Some Still Affected, INFOSECURITY, (Mar. 1,
2011),
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/16278/gmail-failure-hits160000-users-some-still-affected.
45
Id.
46
See Ben Treynor, Gmail Back Soon for Everyone, GMAIL BLOG (Feb. 28, 2011,
6:30 PM), http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2011/02/gmail-back-soon-for-everyone
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Gmail to send work-related emails “containing potentially sensitive
information.”47 Users’ willingness to store such important business
information in the cloud—together with the cloud’s proven fragility—
effectively illustrates the enormity of this budding issue.
While losing cell phone contact lists and emails might not set off
too many alarm bells, companies storing scientific research in the cloud
have much more at stake. For example, the 1000 Genomes Project, an
initiative aimed at “build[ing] the most detailed map of human genetic
variation to date,” retains Amazon’s cloud services to perform computation
on and store its research.48 The Project currently houses 7.3 terabytes worth
of data on Amazon’s servers,49 almost as much data as the entire printed
collection in the Library of Congress.50 The loss of this data would be
catastrophic not only to the progress of the Project, but also to the progress
of the science of genetics in general.
Similarly, companies that choose to have cloud providers host their
websites could suffer substantial revenue loss due to potential service
outages. Domino’s Pizza is one such company—it is currently working
51
with Microsoft to host their online pizza ordering website in the cloud.
To date, Domino’s has received over $1 billion in sales through its
52
website. As a consequence, losing service for even a few hours could
effectuate losses in the millions of dollars. Losses could be even more
53
severe if the outage occurred during a high-load time like the Super Bowl.
If companies similar to Domino’s acquiesce to clickwrap agreements
containing limitation on liability clauses, those companies would have no
everyone.html (noting that the accounts were lost on February 27 and access was
not restored for all until late on March 2).
47
Warwick Ashford, Gmail Failure Highlights Risks of Web-Based E-mail,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.computerweekly.com/
Articles/2011/03/01/245663/Gmail-failure-highlights-risks-of-web-based-e-mail
.htm.
48
1000 Genomes Project, AMAZON, http://aws.amazon.com/datasets/4383?_encod
ing=UTF8&jiveRedirect=1 (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
49
Id.
50
Megabytes, Gigabytes, Terabytes . . . What Are They?, WHAT’S A BYTE,
http://www.whatsabyte.com/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
51
Marsman, supra note 23.
52
Bob Evans, Microsoft Cloud Gets $1 Billion Delivery from Domino’s,
INFORMATIONWEEK GLOBAL CIO BLOG (Mar. 9, 2010, 1:53 PM),
http://www.informationweek.com/blog/main/archives/2010/03/microsoft_cloud_
2.html.
53
John Wilen, Super Bowl’s Big Day for TV, Pizza Sales, USA TODAY (Jan. 31,
2008, 5:41 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/2008-01-30300991490_x.htm (“Domino's Pizza sales jump 30 percent on Super Bowl Sunday
compared to a typical Sunday . . . .”).
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recourse through which to recoup damages from their cloud providers, even
if those providers were extraordinarily negligent.
Cloud service use will likely not be confined to less vital industries
like pizza delivery for long.54 India’s Bombay Stock Exchange already
stores some of its less critical data in the cloud and expects to serve more
data and users from the cloud within the next five years.55 Commentators in
England have begun clamoring for the London Stock Exchange to utilize
more cloud services.56 Migration of American financial market data and
trading services may soon be moving to the cloud as well.57 As such, a
service outage for a major stock exchange would be devastating to the
national—and possibly the global—economy.
A clickwrap-based
restriction on recovering losses from a cloud provider who might
negligently cause such staggering damages borders on the absurd.
Cloud customers with so much at stake ought to possess sufficient
bargaining power to have limitation on liability clauses removed from their
58
contracts. Yet small start-up businesses with significant quantities of
valuable information do not have this luxury and are often left with a
59
boilerplate clickwrap agreement. This begs the question: what if Mark
Zuckerberg had originally decided to host Facebook in the cloud?
Zuckerberg, then a college student, would have had no choice but to agree
54

The cloud computing market accounted for $68.3 billion in revenue in 2010 and
is expected to grow by an extremely healthy 20% per year to $148.8 billion by
2014. Press Release, Gartner, Gartner Says Worldwide Cloud Services Market to
Surpass $68 Billion in 2010 (Jun. 22, 2010), available at http://www.gartner.com/i
t/page.jsp?id=1389313.
55
Penny Jones, Indian Cloud Perspectives, DATACENTERDYNAMICS (Mar. 24,
2011), http://www.datacenterdynamics.com/focus/archive/2011/03/indian-cloudperspectives.
56
See, e.g., Jim Anderson, London Stock Exchange Glitch–Could Cloud Computing
Have Saved the Day?, THE ACCIDENTAL SUCCESSFUL CIO (Sept. 15, 2008, 9:02
AM), http://www.theaccidentalsuccessfulcio.com/uncategorized/london-stockexchange-glitch-could-cloud-computing-have-saved-the-day.
57
See, e.g., NASDAQ Data-on-demand, NASDAQ, https://data.nasdaq.com
/DOD.aspx (last visited Mar. 15, 2012) (“NASDAQ Data-On-Demand is a new
cloud computing solution . . . that provides easy and flexible access to large
amounts of high quality and reliable historical Level 1 data for NASDAQ[],
NYSE[], OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB), Pinksheet and other regional-listed
securities.”).
58
Unfortunately, access to these contracts is not available to the public; confirming
this suspicion is not possible.
59
See, e.g., Arthur Miller Dance Studios of Cleveland, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d
685, 704 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1952) (describing how a party with less bargaining
power may be “in no position to object to boiler plate restrictive covenants placed
before him to sign”).
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to the provider’s clickwrap agreement and would have been given
absolutely no opportunity to negotiate. If negligence on behalf of a cloud
provider had then stifled Facebook’s success, Zuckerberg would have been
unable to recover any damages. Currently, analysts estimate the value of
Zuckerberg’s little startup to be $50 billion.60 As such, not allowing
startups to collect damages due to a clause in a clickwrap agreement is
beyond the scope of allowable risk. Given the astronomical potential
liability that exists in this area, these clauses should be examined closely by
the judiciary and should not be present in cloud computing contracts in the
first instance.

B. A Long-Term and Short-Term Solution: Information and Fresh
Judicial Review
Thus far, the cloud computing market has allowed these limitations
on liability clauses to perpetuate. The proper inquiry now is whether
61
customers are aware of their diminished rights and, if not, whether
customers would tolerate these clauses if they knew about them.
Increasing awareness, then, is a necessary strategy. Informing
cloud customers that they have little or no ability to recover damages
resulting from their providers’ negligent or even knowingly wanton acts
might lead more customers to attempt to avoid these clauses. Further, if all
customers knew about these clauses, they would likely be unwilling to pay
as much for cloud services.62 In response to falling prices, cloud providers
might relax their limitation on liability clauses or even remove them
altogether.
Removal of the limitation on liability clauses would likely cause
prices for cloud computing services to increase. Since cloud providers will
be more vulnerable to liability, they may charge their customers more to
60

Tom Foreman, How Much Is Facebook Really Worth?, (Mar. 8, 2011) CNN,
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-03-08/tech/facebook.overvalued_1_mark-zuckerbergfacebook-worldwide-users?_s=PM:TECH.
61
See Smith, supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text (noting that in the case of one
clickwrap agreement, 88% of users failed to read the online contract before
agreeing to it). It is unclear how many cloud customers are actually aware of their
limited rights to sue for damages under cloud license agreements.
62
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 561–65 (1984) (describing the mechanisms by
which market prices move with inflows of new information—slower movement for
narrow dissemination of information, faster movement for wider dissemination). If
high-profile litigation on these clauses occurred, then one would expect the prices
of cloud computing services to drop relatively quickly. See id. If, on the other
hand, information were spread word-of-mouth, prices would not move with such
alacrity. See id.
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cover the costs of future adverse judgments. In the end, the free market will
dictate how much the removal of these clauses is worth to cloud customers.
For now, it seems likely that the market could become bifurcated: one set of
cloud providers could continue to include limitation on liability clauses and
cater to customers who do not store valuable data in the cloud, while the
other set could remove the clauses and sell services to those who entrust
cloud providers with valuable data.
Market shifts through information take time, however. In the
interim, the gap between full public information and the cloud market’s
response should be filled with renewed scrutiny of limitation on liability
clauses by the judiciary. Indeed, the potential scope of liability assumed by
cloud providers is much broader63 than liability found in other online arenas
where limitation on liability clauses are routinely used. Because of the
disparity between potential liability in the cloud and liability in other
Internet markets, precedent urging the enforcement of clickwrap agreements
should not be followed by judges in the cloud context. Alternatively,
rejuvenation of the doctrine of unconscionability would help cloud
customers avoid waiving their important legal rights.64 Just as courts used
unconscionability to strike down onerous clauses during the early days of
the Internet, the same should be done during the infancy of cloud
computing. In rejuvenating this doctrine, the courts might prevent harm to
the cloud computing market while providing adequate safeguards to its
customers.

CONCLUSION
As more consumers join the cloud computing revolution and use of
the cloud becomes ubiquitous, the likelihood of data-eliminating and
service-interrupting mistakes by cloud providers will continue to increase.
Unfortunately, customers who are bound by limitation on liability clauses
through clickwrap agreements may not be able to recover any damages at
all. In the past, courts have been willing to enforce such clauses.65
Nevertheless, because the customer’s potential damages in the cloud are
much greater than in other areas, courts should examine these clauses
closely and refuse to blindly apply precedent that is incapable of fully
addressing the wide-ranging and unique implications of the cloud.

63

See supra Part III.A.
For a good primer on the doctrine of unconscionability, see Amy J. Schmitz,
Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALA. L. REV. 73 (2006).
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See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
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